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Abstract: 
When reviewing research related to autism, it is clear that it is 
dominated by biological and psychological concerns, with autism 
being defined as a developmental deviance, dysfunction, and 
deficit.  Much of this research assumes a functionalist philosophy 
regarding deviations from statistical norms as pathological and in 
need of remediation.  This research feeds into a hegemonic view of 
ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHV ¶QRUPDOF\·ZLWKFULWLFDO VRFLDOH[SODQDWLRQV EHLQJORVW
under the sheer mass of research from this viewpoint.  Despite the 
ascendency of this functionalist philosophy, there is a growing concern 
reJDUGLQJ OLVWHQLQJWR¶DXWLVWLF YRLFHV·IURPDSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO
perspective (Biklen, 2005) and with regards to the wider social 
construction of autism (Nadesan, 2005; Timini et al. 2011).  However, 
the study of autism on a micro-sociological level has been given 
precious little attention.  This paper utilises the theories of Garfinkel 
(1967) and Goffman (1955, 1959, 1963, 1974) in particular, in 
order to question current ways of perceiving autism, highlighting issues 
concerning social interactions involving autistic people, and the stigma 
RIDXWLVPDVZHOODVGHFRQVWUXFWLQJ WKH¶P\WK·RID¶ODFNRIHPSDWK\·




Sociological Analysis of Autism 
By Damian E M Milton 
Introduction 
A currently popular modeOIRUUHVHDUFKLQJ KHDOWKLVVXHV LVWKH¶ELRSV\FKRVRFLDO· %36PRGHORIKHDOWK
(Engel, 1977).  This model attempts to move beyond the traditional biomedical model of health that 
IUDPHGKHDOWKDQG LOOQHVV LQWHUPVRIDELRORJLFDO GHYLDWLRQIURP¶QRUPDO·IXQctioning, due to pathogens, 
developmental abnormalities, or injury.  The BPS model looks beyond this reductionist framework to 
include psychological and social factors that affect health, with each factor interacting and impacting on 
each other.  The model has been criticised however, for a lack of theoretical integration between these 
factors, and for simply stating an obvious fact (Pilgrim, 2002).  Pilgrim (2002) also states that the BPS 
model has not been fully realised and that the biomedical model is still dominant. 
When reviewing research related to autism, it is clear that it is dominated by biological and psychological 
concerns, with autism being defined as a developmental deviance, dysfunction, and deficit.  Much of this 
research assumes a functionalist philosophy regarding deviations from statistical norms as pathological, 
and in need of remediation.  This philosophy is taken for granted when looking at the social context of 
autism, in which autistic people are perceived to be socially abnormal and dysfunctional, with much policy 
UHODWHGUHVHDUFKWDNLQJ DQHFRQRPLFSHUVSHFWLYHRIWKH¶FRVWRIDXWLVP· .QDSS HWDO  This research 
IHHGVLQWRDKHJHPRQLFYLHZRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHV ¶QRUPDOF\·ZLWKFULWLFDO VRFLDOH[SODQDWLRQVEHLQJ ORVW
under the sheer mass of research from this viewpoint. 
´$OWKRXJK WKHUHLVDELRORJLFDODVSHFW WRWKLVFRQGLWLRQQDPHGDXWLVP WKHVRFLDOIDFWRUV LQYROYHG LQLWV
identification, representation, interpretation, remediation, and performance are the most important factors 
LQWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIZKDW LWPHDQVWREHDXWLVWLF IRULQGLYLGXDOV IRUIDPLOLHVDQGIRUVRFLHW\µ1DGHVDQ
2005, p. 2). 
,QWKH¶(FRORJLFDO 6\VWHPV7KHRU\·GHYHORSHGE\WKHSV\FKRORJLVW8ULH%URIHQEUHQQHU UDWKHUWKDQ
examining the inner environment of the child, psychological development is seen within a context of wider 
social systems working at four levels: the microsystem (the immediate social environments that people 
inhabit), the mesosystem (where two microsystems interact), the exosystem (a broader social context which 
indirectly influences development), and the macrosystem (the wider social context).  This theory forms a 
framework within which one can examine various levels of social context in the study of autism.  Within the 
field of auWLVP WKHUHLVDJURZLQJFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJ OLVWHQLQJ WR¶DXWLVWLF YRLFHV·IURPDSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO
perspective (Biklen, 2005) and with regard to the wider social construction of autism (Nadesan, 2005; 
Timini et al. 2011).  However, the study of autism on a micro-sociological level has been given precious 
little attention.  This paper utilises the theories of Garfinkel (1967) and Goffman (1955, 1959, 1963, 
1974) in particular, in order to question current ways of perceiving autism, highlighting issues concerning 
VRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQV LQYROYLQJ DXWLVWLF SHRSOHDQGWKHVWLJPDRIDXWLVPDVZHOODVGHFRQVWUXFWLQJ WKH¶P\WK·
RID¶ODFNRIHPSDWK\· %DURQ-Cohen, 2008; 2011). 
Ethnomethodology and Autism 
The ethnomethodological perspective was first formalised by Garkinkel (1967), as a development from 
phenomenological theory.  7KHWHUP¶(WKQR·UHIHUULQJWRWKHVWRFNRIFRPPRQVHQVHNQRZOHGJHDYDLODEOH WR
DPHPEHURIDVRFLHW\HJWKHUXOHVRIDJDPHRIQRXJKWVDQGFURVVHVDQG¶0HWKRGRORJ\·LQWKLV
instance referring to the methods or strategies that people employ in different settings to make their 
intended meanings understandable (e.g. turn-taking in conversations).  An ethnomethodologist suspends or 
abandons the belief that an actual social order exists, but rather, suggests that social reality is 
DFFRPSOLVKHG DQGFRQWLQXDOO\FRQVWUXFWHG E\¶VNLOOHGVRFLDODFWRUV· 
7KURXJKKLV ¶EUHDFKLQJ· H[SHULPHQWV*DUILQNHO  GHOLEHUDWHO\YLRODWHGVRFLDOUHDOLW\LQRUGHUWRVKHG
light on the methods used by people to construct and maintain social reality.  Garfinkel (1967) argued 
WKDWVRFLDOUHDOLW\ZDVIUDJLOH LQQDWXUHDQGZKHQWKH¶QDWXUDO DWWLWXGH· WKHEHOLHIWKDWHYHU\WKLQJLVKRZ
RQHWKLQNV LWLVDQGRWKHUVSHUFHLYHWKLQJV LQPXFKWKHVDPHZD\LV¶EUHDFKHG· SHople are put under a 
state of stress and do everything in their power to repair the breach.  Reactions to breaching can be 
extreme, yet this also shows the importance people place on maintaining order in their views of the social 
world. 
Rather than lacking D¶WKHRU\RIPLQG· LWLVDUJXHG KHUHWKDWGXHWRGLIIHUHQFHV LQWKHZD\DXWLVWLF SHRSOH
SURFHVV LQIRUPDWLRQ WKH\DUHQRWVRFLDOLVHG LQWRWKHVDPHVKDUHG¶HWKQR·DV¶QHXURW\SLFDO· SHRSOHDQGWKXV
¶EUHDFKHV· LQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ KDSSHQ DOOWKHWLPHOHDYLQJboth in a state of confusion.  The difference is 
that the neurotypical person can repair the breach, by the reassuring belief that approximately 99 out of 
SHRSOHVWLOO WKLQNDQGDFW OLNHWKH\GRDQGUHPLQGWKHPVHOYHVWKDW WKH\DUHWKH¶QRUPDO·RQHV  For 
0F*HHU WKH¶WKHRU\RIPLQG·GHILFLWPRGHORIDXWLVP LVDRQH-sided asymmetrical view of two 
people failing to understand one another, with the personal accounts of those diagnosed showing that the 
supposed lack of subjective awareness of self and others is simply untrue. 
The Myth of Empathy 
Ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel (1967) and Cicourel (1974) suggest that interactions between 
LQGLYLGXDOV LQYROYHDVVXPSWLRQV RI¶QRUPDOF\·VXFKDV WKHDVVXPSWLRQ WKDWRWKHUVZLOOEHKDYHLQH[SHFWHG
ways, and that when ambiguous meanings are found, they will either be deemed irrelevant to the 
interaction, or will be immanently explained.  6XFK¶LQWHUSUHWLYHSURFHGXUHV· LQYROYHDQ LQGXFWLYH ORJLFDO
process, without which an individual would be uncertain of the meaning of the interaction, what was to 
happen next, and perceiving how others may be experiencing the interaction.  According to Durig (1993), 
the impairments and abilities associated with autism can be seen with regard to the use of deductive and 
abductive reasoning, rather than inductive logic.  For Durig (1993), deductive intellectual activities involve 
¶LI-WKHQ·UXOHVHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHZLWKDJXDUDQWHHG RXWFRPHVXFKDVQXPHULFDO FDOFXODWLRQ PHPRULVLQJ
information, or collecting objects, whilst abductive activities involve creativity and imagination.  'XULJ·V
(1993) classification of autism as a preference/reliance on deductive logic (in particular) as opposed to 
inductive inference, gives an alternative way to conceptualise Baron-&RKHQ·V  ¶empathising-
V\VWHPLVLQJ· WKHRU\  5DWKHUWKDQDODFNRI¶WKHRU\RIPLQG·RUDELOLW\ WRHPSDWKLVH'XULJ VXJJHVWV
that an apparent inability in this area comes from a different way of processing information, which does 
bear a resemblance to Baron-CohHQ·V  FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RIDXWLVWLF VWUHQJWKV FRPLQJIURPDQDELOLW\
IRU¶VSOLWWLQJ· DQG ¶V\VWHPLVLQJ· \HWGRHVQRWLQYROYHWKHQHHGWRXVHDFRQFHSWRIHPSDWK\  This 
IRUPXODWLRQZRXOGDOVRVXJJHVW WKDWUDWKHU WKDQEHLQJD¶FRUHGHILFLW· WKHDSSHDUDQFH RIDODFNRI¶WKHRU\
RIPLQG·ZRXOGEHDSRWHQWLDOFRQVHTXHQFHRIDQ LQGLYLGXDO SURFHVVLQJ LQWHUDFWLRQV ZLWKRWKHUVXVLQJ
deductive, rather than inductive logic.  
According to Baron-Cohen (2011), a lack of intent to cause harm can co-H[LVWZLWK¶]HUR HPSDWK\·DQG
VXJJHVWV WKDWWKLV LVWKHSDWWHUQIRXQGZLWKDXWLVWLF SHRSOHVXJJHVWLQJ WKDWWKH\DUH¶]HURSRVLWLYH·UDWKHU
WKDQ ¶]HURQHJDWLYH· DVKHVXJJHVWV LVWKHFDVHZLWKRWKHUQHXURORJLFDO ODEHOVRISDWKRORJ\  This line of 
thinking however implies that a lack of empathy does not in and of itself lead to criminality or cruelty to 
others, but the intent to cause harm to others.  Thus, if one were able to banish a lack of empathy, one 
would not banish cruelty.  7KHIRUPXODWLRQRI¶]HURQHJDWLYH· DQGWKXV¶]HURSRVLWLYH·GRHVQRWPDNHVHQVH
however, as the intent to cause harm would require some sense of understanding regarding the existence 
RIRWKHUVRXWVLGHRIRQHVHOIDVZHOODVQRWLRQVRIFDXVHDQGHIIHFWUHJDUGLQJ RQH·VDFWLRQVRQRWKHUV  In 
RWKHUZRUGVFUXHOW\UHTXLUHV¶FRJQLWLYHHPSDWK\·ZKLFK LVVDLGWREHODFNLQJ LQWKHFDVHRI¶]HURQHJDWLYH·
individuals. 
7KHDPRXQWRIDSSDUHQW ¶HPSDWK\·H[SUHVVHGE\DQLQGLYLGXDO DXWLVWLF RUQRWZLOOYDU\GHSHQGLQJ RQ
who they are interacting with, and the wider social context, on both their ability to understand the 
attention of others, and in emotional reactions to this information.  ,WLVDUJXHG KHUHWKDW¶HPSDWK\· LVD
convenient illusion, and the phenomenon that people speak of when referring to it has more to do with 
ODQJXDJH DQGDVHQVHRI¶VKDUHG·FXOWXUDO PHDQLQJVV\PEROV RUWKHLU¶HWKQR·   It can be argued that 
neuro-typical people have no better understanding of how autistics think, than vice versa (McGeer, 
2004).  The philosopher Thomas Nagel (1981) wrote about the impossibility of understanding what it may 
be like to be a bat, yet this could be expanded to all other creatures, including humans.  By looking at the 
breaching experiments of Garfinkel (1967), one can see the fragile nature of the social reality that 
people inhabit.  *DUILQNHODUJXHGWKDWSHRSOHKDYHDWHQGHQF\WR¶ILOO LQWKHJDSV· LQWKHLUSHUFHSWLRQLQ
order to gain what they think is a full or whole picture.  Due to differences in the way autistic people 
process information (whether it be monotropism, a weak drive toward central coherence, a lack of mirror 
neurons, or a lack of long-UDQJH FRQQHFWLYLW\LQWKHEUDLQ WKLV ¶ILOOLQJ RIJDSV· WHQGVQRWWRRFFXU DWOHDVW
to the same extent).  Autistic people have a tendency to be more literal, and work upon what is tangible 
DQGSUHVHQWWKXVFRQFOXVLRQV DUHUHDFKHGWKURXJKDYDLODEOH LQIRUPDWLRQZLWKRXW ¶ILOOLQJ LQWKHJDSV·  It is 
also interesting to note that these issues may well have been partly recognised in the work of Hans 
Asperger: 
´$VSHUJHU PD\KDYHEHOLHYHGWKDWKLVSDWLHQWV ODFNHGWKHQDWXUDO DWWLWXGHWKDWFRQVWLWXWHV WKHVRFLDOO\
VKDUHGOLIHZRUOGDVXQGHUVWRRGSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOO\µ 1DGHVDQ SS 
,WKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWD¶WKHRU\RIPLQG·DQGHPSDWK\DUH essential to that which makes humans what 
they are.  Thus, the characterisation of autistic people lacking such abilities suggests that they are 
somewhat less than fully human (Lawson, 2010), and when also linked to criminality and cruelty to others, 
brinJV EDFNQRWLRQVRIWKH¶DWDYLVWLF FULPLQDO·  ,WLVDUJXHGKHUHWKDWGHSLFWLQJ DXWLVWLF SHRSOHDV ¶ODFNLQJ
HPSDWK\·LVDQLQDFFXUDWH DQGSRWHQWLDOO\KLJKO\GDQJHURXVQDUUDWLYH WRSXUVXH 
¶8V·DQG¶7KHP· 
People have a tendency to align themselves to otherVZLWKLQ WKHLU¶LQ-JURXS· DQG LQFUHDVHWKLVERQGWKURXJK
WKHGHQLJUDWLRQ RI¶RXW-JURXSV· 7DMIHODQG7XUQHU  Within interactions with others of an in-group, it 
FDQEHHDVLO\VKRZQWKDWSHRSOHKDYHOLWWOHFRPSDVVLRQRU¶DIIHFWLYHHPSDWK\·IRU¶RXWVLGHUV·  Tajfel and 
7XUQHU  XWLOLVLQJ ¶PLQLPDOJURXSH[SHULPHQWV·IRXQGWKDW WKLVGHQLJUDWLRQDOVRRFFXUUHG HYHQZKHQ
distinctions between groups were arbitrary. 
$FFRUGLQJ WRWKH¶6RFLDO,GHQWLW\7KHRU\·RI7DMIHODQG7XUQHU  LQGLYLGXDOV LQFrease their self-image 
E\LGHQWLI\LQJ SRVLWLYHO\ZLWKDJURXSWRZKLFKWKH\EHORQJEXWDOVRE\GLVFULPLQDWLQJ DJDLQVW WKH¶RXW-
JURXS·  Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggested that stereotyping others was a normal cognitive process, in 
which there is a tendency to group phenomena together.  In doing so, the differences between groups are 
H[DJJHUDWHGDORQJZLWKVLPLODULWLHV WRWKRVHZLWKLQWKH¶LQ-JURXS· WKURXJKDSURFHVVRIFDWHJRULVDWLRQ
identification, and comparison. 
Link and Phelan (2001) suggest that stigma occurs through four social processes.  Firstly, by human 
difference being labelled, secondly by dominant cultural ideology linking labelled individuals to 
undesirable characteristics, or negative stereotypes, thirdly a dislocation between groups establishes a 
GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ¶XV·DQG ¶WKHP·DQG ODVWO\ODEHOOHG LQGLYLGXDOV H[SHULHQFHGLVFULPLQDWLRQ DQGDORVVRI
status.  In this conceptualisation, stigma is contingent upon differentials of social power. 
Stigma and Autism 
Durkheim (1895) was the first sociologist to consider stigma as a social phenomena: 
´,PDJLQHDVRFLHW\RIVDLQWV DSHUIHFWFORLVWHURIH[HPSODU\LQGLYLGXDOV  Crimes or deviance, properly so-
called, will there be unknown; but faults, which appear venial to the layman, will there create the same 
scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousnesses.  If then, this society has the power to 
MXGJHDQGSXQLVK LWZLOOGHILQHWKHVHDFWVDVFULPLQDO RUGHYLDQWDQGZLOOWUHDWWKHPDVVXFKµ 'XUNKHLP
1895). 
In this early functionalist formulation of stigma and deviance, both are viewed as inevitable within human 
societies, and indeed functional for society in terms of maintaining a moral code of values, supporting the 
social norms of a society and the stability of society as a whole.  Although this view has been criticised 
from a number of perspectives, it is interesting to note that Durkheim also argued that another function of 
deviance in society was to challenge society and open up possibilities for social change.  For Durkheim, a 
society with an overly strict moral code of behaviour would be just as dysfunctional as an anomic society 
ZLWKDODFNRIVXFKD¶FRQVHQVXV· DQLGHDVDGO\ODFNLQJ LQPXFKVXEVHTXHQW IXQFWLRQDOLVW RU1HZ5LJKW
sociological theory (Parsons, 1951; Murray, 1990). 
,QWKHILHOGRIDXWLVPVXFKDIXQFWLRQDOLVW YLHZRIVRFLHW\DQGDQLQGLYLGXDO·V SODFHZLWKLQLWDUHRIWHQWDNHQ
IRUJUDQWHGGHSLFWLQJ DXWLVWLF SHRSOHDVDILQDQFLDO EXUGHQ LQQHHGRIFRUUHFWLRQDQG ¶QRUPDOLVDWLRQ·  As 
Timini et al. (2011) aUJXHEHLQJYLHZHGDV¶QRUPDO·KDVEHFRPHSURJUHVVLYHO\KDUGHUWRDFKLHYH 
´7KHGHVLUHWRFRQWURODPHQGRUHYHQH[WLQJXLVKKXPDQEHKDYLRXUV WKDWGHSDUWIURPDQLQFUHDVLQJO\
QDUURZVWHUHRW\SHRIQRUPDOLW\KDVEHGHYLOOHGWKHKLVWRU\RISV\FKLDWU\µ 7LPLQLet al., 2011, p. 8). 
Lawson (2008) suggests that the discipline of psychology has largely conditioned social concepts of what it 
LVWREH¶QRUPDO·\HWDOVRKLJKOLJKWV WKHUROHRIPHGLDDQGELJEXVLQHVV LQPDLQWDLQLQJ WKHVH
concepts.  Lawson (2008) calls fRUDQH[SDQVLRQRIZKDWLVFRQVLGHUHG ¶QRUPDO·DQGVXJJHVWV WKDWVRFLHW\
is intolerant and non-inclusive of difference, preventing the healthy development of a wide population of 
people.  This can be seen as an attempt to reduce the social stigma attached to autism and difference 
more generally, yet without the abolishment of the label, as is suggested by Timini et al. (2011).  Indeed, 
it is argued here that such a move would not extinguish discrimination against those currently deemed 
autistic.  This can be shown by a recent study into autistic epidemiology in adults in England (Traolach et 
al., 2011), which found that of those exhibiting autism, none were formally diagnosed.  Yet in comparison 
to non-autistics, were likely to have a lower level of education and employment, and to be more likely to 
be living in government housing. 
According to Cottrell (1942, 1978), an interaction between two individuals involves each participant 
taking on the role of the other, and adjusting their behaviour to the responses of one another.  Thus, an 
individual needs to both process incoming information, as well as developing a strategy of how to present 
themselves in a meaningful way.  From Plato to Shakespeare, it has often been remarked that human 
social life is analogous with that of actors on a stage.  This dramaturgical analogy was theoretically 
applied by Erving Goffman (1955, 1959, 1963, 1974) to the study of human interactions.  Through this 
formulation, Goffman (1955, 1959, 1963) argued that social actors were involved in a continuous 
management of the impressions they give to others.  For Goffman (1959, 1963), the ability to manage 
VXFK LPSUHVVLRQV LVIXQGDPHQWDO IRUDQLQGLYLGXDO WREHFRQVLGHUHG ¶QRUPDO·E\RWKHUV  Hence, those that 
exhibit autism, whether diagnosed or not, are likely to be considered abnormal and subsequently 
stigmatised. 
To Goffman (1963), a stigma is an attribute, behaviour, or social category that is socially discrediting to 
the individual.  Goffman (1963) described stigma as the gap between the actual social identity an 
LQGLYLGXDO LQKDELWV LQOLYHGUHDOLW\DQGWKH¶YLUWXDO VRFLDOLGHQWLW\·H[SHFWHGRIWKHPE\DQLGHDOLVHGVRFLDO
norm.  7KRVHZKRRFFXS\VXFKDVRFLDOSRVLWLRQFDQEHFODVVLILHG DVHLWKHU¶GLVFUHGLWHG· RU
¶GLVFUHGLWDEOH·  Those ¶GLVFUHGLWHG· EHLQJWKRVHZKRKDYHKDGWKHLUVWLJPDUHYHDOHGWRRWKHUVRUZKRDUH
openly visible.  The problem here in terms of impression management, is how to manage social interactions 
when one knows they are known to hold a stigmatising attribute which can affect interactions with 
others.  )RUWKH¶GLVFUHGLWDEOH· WKHVWLJPDLVQRWNQRZQDERXWDQGWKHUHIRUHLPSUHVVLRQPDQDJHPHQW
LQYROYHVWKHFRQFHDOPHQWRIVWLJPDNQRZQDV ¶SDVVLQJ· DQGZKHQWRUHYHDOLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW WKH
attribute and to whom.  Goffman (1963) suggests that the stigmatised may well see themselves as 
¶QRUPDO·\HWDWWKHVDPHWLPHZLOOUHDOLVHWKDW WKH\DUH¶GLIIHUHQW·ZLWKLQ WKHSUHVHQFHRI¶QRUPDO·
people.  $QLGHQWLW\WKDWFDQFDXVHVRFLDOVKDPHDQGZKHQLQWHUQDOLVHG WKURXJKD¶self-IXOILOOLQJ SURSKHF\·
(Becker, 1963) can lead to low self-esteem and even self-degradation.  In the case of autism, amongst 
other perceived differences, it is the very ability to manage impressions that is viewed as abnormal and 
not meeting social expectation.  (YHQWKRVHGHHPHG¶KLJK-IXQFWLRQLQJ· DQGZKRZLWKDJUHDWGHDORI
FRQVFLRXVHIIRUWDUHDEOHWR¶SDVVDVQRUPDO·FDQWKHQEHVWLJPDWLVHG DV¶IDOVHO\·FODLPLQJWKHLUDXWLVWLF
status, and further disabled by not having their difficulties recognised.  
-RQHVHWDO H[SDQGHG*RIIPDQ·VLGHDVRQVWLJPDWRVL[GLPHQVLRQV WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKDVWLJPDLV
concealable, whether the stigma becomes more prominent over time, the degree to which the stigma 
disrupts social interactions, the aesthetics of otKHU·VUHDFWLRQV WRWKHVWLJPD WKHRULJLQRIWKHVWLJPDELUWK
accidental, or deliberate), and the danger perceived by others on how the stigma may affect 
them.  Although all of these dimensions can affect autistic people to greater or lesser degrees, two of them 
are of particular interest: obviously, stigma that disrupts social interactions, yet increasingly, the stigma of 
SHUFHLYHGGDQJHUZKLFKFDQEHOLQNHGWRQRWLRQVRID¶ODFNRIHPSDWK\· 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has examined aspects of what it is to be autistic from a micro-sociological perspective, 
highlighting issues of social interaction and stigma.  In so doing, it has shown some of the inadequacies of 
¶RXWVLGHU·DSSURDFKHV WKDWREMHFWLI\WKHDXWLVWLF VXEMHFWIURPQRUPDWLYHIXQFWLRQDOLVW SHUspectives, in 
SDUWLFXODU WKHSHUQLFLRXVYLHZRIDXWLVWLF SHRSOHODFNLQJ ¶HPSDWK\·  It is also anticipated that such 
reflections could lead to research utilising micro-sociological perspectives in conjunction with 
phenomenological and discursive methods. 
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